The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation by Haft, Robert J.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 5 
1982 
The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the 
Large Corporation 
Robert J. Haft 
Georgetown University Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 
MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol80/iss5/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE EFFECT OF INSIDER TRADING RULES 
ON THE INTERNAL EFFICIENCY OF THE 
LARGE CORPORATIONt 
Robert J. Haft* 
"Insiders" - directors, officers, and employees of a corporation 
- cannot use material nonpublic infi;>rmation about the corporation 
when trading in the organized securities markets. They must either 
disclose the information or abstain from trading their corporation's 
stock.1 
Professor Kenneth Scott recently summarized the three primary 
justifications for this rule.2 First, the "Fair Play" rationale posits 
that taking advantage of inside information that is unavailable to 
other parties is inherently inequitable. This "one-on-one" perspec-
tive asserts that insiders unfairly obtain benefits from and damage 
the public investor on the other side of the trade. A variation of the 
Fair Play rationale speaks of the "integrity of the securities mar-
kets": If the public believes that the game is unfair and chooses not 
to play, the markets will suffer and the efficient allocation of capital 
will be impeded.3 Second, the "Informed Market" rationale asserts 
t Copyright© 1982 by Robert J. Haft. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University ,Law Center. B.A. 1952, C.C.N.Y.; 
LL.B. 1954, Columbia Law School. - Ed. 
I. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-30 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970), ajfd in part, revd in part and remanded on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
In the only Supreme Court case defining "materiality" (and there, for the purposes of the 
federal proxy rules), various formulations were used on the same page: 
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable share-
holder would consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . . It does not require 
proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the 
reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a showing 
of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have 
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put an-
other way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
"total mix" of information made available. 
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (footnotes omitted). 
2. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule J0b-5, .Disclosure, and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
801, 804 (1980). 
3. Id at 804-09. Professor Scott states that the fair play and the integrity of the market 
rationales stem from the idea that traders in the markets should have relatively equal access to 
material information. Since the insider has unequal access, his trading is unfair. 
Some co=entators, prominent among them Henry Manne, have objected that the only 
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that prohibiting insider trading "removes an incentive to delay the 
release of corporate information so that insiders may first take a 
trading profit."4 The rule thus "facilitates the flow of information to 
the market, so that it may better perform its functions of security 
evaluation and capital allocation."5 Third, the "Business Property" 
theory adopts the view that the insider trading ban "affords protec-
tion to the property rights of the firm in inside information . . . ."6 
A seminal case held the rule applicable to "information intended to 
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal 
benefit of anyone."7 
effect the insiders' trades can have is to move the market in the correct direction, so that 
the other party to the transaction, if affected at all, receives a better price than if the 
insider had dutifully stayed out of the market. In that event, how can the other party 
claim injury or show damages? . • • 
• • • Most of the commentators who reject Manne's conclusions, as practically all of 
them do, fall back at this point on simply asserting that insider trading is not right . . . • 
Id at 807 (footnotes omitted). Scott argues that the individual investor is " 'protected' by the 
price established by the market mechanism, not by his personal bargaining power or posi-
tion. . . . Insider trading is hardly an unknown or unanticipated phenomenon; the returns 
expected by investors would not include any gains unique to insiders." Id. at 808. Scott as-
serts that insiders' profits "do not necessarily represent some sort of 'unfair' or windfall gain 
for them" because the prospect of insider trading profits is part of their total compensation. 
Id "From a private standpoint, then, the fairness concern proves to have surprismgly little 
substance, when viewed in terms of the game rather than as a single, isolated play." Id. at 809. 
4. Id at 810 (emphasis in original). Professor Scott counters this rationale, in part, as 
follows: 
But let us examine further the proposition that [the insider trading ban] does serve to 
reduce, at least to a small degree, delays in disclosure of available corporate information. 
When the information is positive (giving rise to an increase in stock pnce), the proposition 
is plausible; if insiders cannot profit from a trading delay, they otherwise nave ample 
incentives to release promptly the information • • . . Good news benefits stockholders, 
which usually include the insiders, and correlates with increases in management compen• 
sation. But if the news is bad, the immediate incentives for insiders now point in the other 
direction, and therefore it is to be expected that one should be quite sure of the facts 
before making a release, which should be framed to avoid over-reactions by ill-informed 
investors. In this situation, the [ban on insider trading] does not help, since insiders can 
delay or avoid the negative disclosure simply by not tradini. Indeed, the rule makes the 
situation somewhat worse, for by cutting off insider selling 1t also cuts off an activity that 
is itself a source of information to the marketplace and removes an incentive for full 
disclosure promptly upon completion of trading. 
Id. at 810-11 (footnotes omitted). 
5. Id. at 804, 809-14. 
6. Id. at 804, 814-15. Professor Scott states: 
In this view, the wrong committed is essentially that of theft or conversion. The informa-
tion belongs to the firm, but an employee appropriates it for his own use and gain. Where 
and how the trader acquired his knowledge, an aspect less central to the Fair Play or 
Informed Market approaches becomes quite important, but whether the information is 
inside or outside is unimportant. And in the tipping situation, the tippec is comparable to 
one receiving stolen property. 
Id. at 814. After reviewing the applicable case law, he concludes that the Business Property 
"rationale, then, by no means applies to all the situations in which [the insider trading prohibi-
tion] has been invoked, but it provides clear guidance as to the function and the beneficiary of 
the rule in some cases." Id. at 815. 
1. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted). 
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Academics have hotly debated these justifications for years, 8 and 
none of the three has achieved universal acclaim. This Ar:ticle sug-
gests another perspective: Prohibiting insider trading may enhance 
business decision-making in large corporations. With the exception 
of proponents of the Business Property view, analysts have focused 
on how an insider trading rule affects the national securities markets 
and traders in those markets. The internal governance of the large 
corporation is a different matter, one deserving separate 
consideration. 
I. CORPORATE DECISIONS BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED AT 
THE LOWER LEVELS AND PASSED UPWARD 
Whether business decisions will be correct depends directly on 
the accuracy, quality, and timeliness of the information on which 
they are based. In large corporations, this information may pass 
through as many as fifteen hierarchical levels from bottom to top.9 
Organizational and communications scholars have confirmed the ob-
vious: merely because the information is transmitted so many times, 
the message becomes distorted. 10 They have also found that the per-
8. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (favoring in-
sider trading); o. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 93-96 (1970); 
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 
93 HARV. L. REv. 322 (1979); Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule Ue-3 and Dirks: "Faimess" versus 
Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517 (1982); Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic oj'the 
Law, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 720; Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. 
REv. 547 (1970); Mendelson, The Economics oJ Insider Trading Reconsidered, 111 U. PA. L. 
REv. 470 (1969) (criticizing Manne); Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, In-
sider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425 (1967) (criticizing Manne); Wang, 
Trading on Material Nonpublic /'!formation on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and 
Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10/J-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217 (1981); Kripke, Book 
Review, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 212 (1967) (criticizing Manne). 
Professor Michael P. Dooley, in a recent and significant article, analyzes and roundly criti-
cizes the justifications for the present prohibition. Dooley, E'!forcement oJ Insider Trading Re-
strictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1 (1980). He asserts that "the principal objection to insider trading 
•.. ultimately rests on a view of insider trading as indulging one's self-interest to the point of 
dishonesty." Id at 39. He then subjects this objection to an economic "agency cost" analysis 
and later concludes that the objection is meritless. 
9. See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View oJ Corporate Mis-
conduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1138 (1977). The discussion in 
Part I of this Article is premised on the existence of a large and complex organization and is 
thus limited to the large corporation with many hierarchical levels. Part II, which focuses on 
the small group of top-level corporate decision-makers, may well be applicable to large and 
medium-sized corporations. . 
Some information relevant to business decisions may originate at the top of the corpora-
tion. See notes 25-26 infra and accompanying text. Such information usually relates to pro-
spective tender offers or acquisitions, events that are far less common than top-level allocations 
of corporate resources, long-term and strategic planning, marketing, product development, and 
financing. These important but less spectacular decisions require information that proceeds 
from lower levels to the top-level decision-makers. 
10. See id at 1138. 
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sonal biases and self-interest of each sender-subordinate and each 
receiver-superior in the hierarchy exacerbate this obstacle to high-
quality business decisions. 11 
Although decision-makers recognize this· distortion of informa-
tion, they cannot completely counteract it. Superiors may reduce 
distortion by counter-biasing or discounting the content of the 
message by the ·self-interest that they perceive the sender to have in 
the message. 12 Distortion may also be reduced to the extent that the 
sender and receiver "trust" each other.13 But the most common re-
sponse to information distortion in complex organizations is to force 
decision-making downward to specialists or to a unit closer to the 
relevant inf ormation.14 Downward delegation in complex organiza-
tions is efficient because the unit closest to the scene is the most 
knowledgeable, its reaction time is short, and its reaction mode is 
highly programmed. 
Now, let us introduce a rule permitting securities trading by cor-
porate employees, officers, and directors based on the material non-
public information that they receive in the course of their 
employment. This rule would likely impair corporate decision-mak-
ing at all hierarchical levels.15 Subordinates would stall the upward 
11. R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 81, 109-10 (1963); D, 
KATZ & R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 447 (2d ed. 1978); 0. WIL· 
LIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 122-24 
(1975); Carter, The Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Top-Level Coporale JJecisions, 16 AD, 
Sci. Q. 413, 421-27 (1971); Coffee, supra note 9, at 1137-38; Hoffman, Applying Experimental 
Research on Group Problem Solving lo Organizations, IS J. APPLIED BEHAVIORAL Sci, 375, 
379-80 (1979); Stagner, Coporate JJecision Making: An Empirical Study, 53 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 
1, 2 (1969). 
12. R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra note 11, at 77, 82, 110; w. MORRIS, DECENTRALIZATION 
IN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 50-51 (1968). See Newman & Sussman, Controlling the Sycophant: 
Policies and Techniques of Copora/ion Presidents, 43 S.A.M. ADVANCED MGMT. J. 14, 16-19 
(1978). 
13. Boss, Trust and Managerial Problem Solving Revisited, 3 GROUP & ORGANIZATION 
STUDIES 331 (1978); Golembiewski & McConkie, The Centrality of Intepersonal Trust in Group 
Processes, in THEORIES OF GROUP PROCESSES 131, 158-63 (C. Cooper ed. 1975); Roberts & 
O'Reilly, Failures in Upward Communication in Organizations: Three Possible Culprits, 11 
AcAD. MGMT. J. 205, 208-09, 212-13 (1974); Zand, Trust alJd Managerial Problem Solving, 11 
AD. Sc1. Q. 229 (1972). 
14. The complex organization solves many problems involving uncertainty by forcing de-
cision-making downward to the specialists or unit closest to the scene. Each unit deals with the 
slice of the complex environment that the corporation has assigned to it and programs every• 
thing else out The specialists "hedge" by making a decision with foreseeable short-term con-
sequences. This permits fine-tuning from time to time based on continuous feedback. They 
make decisions only when a problem arises, and their responses are usually highly program-
med. The need to act quickly requires the lowest practicable organizational level to make the 
decision. See E. LAWLER & J. RHODE, INFORMATION AND CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS 192-
93 (1976); Van de Ven,A Panel Study on the Effects of Task Uncertainty, Interdependence, and 
Size on Unit JJecision-Making, 8 0RG. & Ao. Sci. 237, 239, 244 (1977). 
15. This idea was first suggested in 1970 by Professor Oliver Williamson, the noted econo-
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flow of critical information to maximize their opportunities for 
financial gain. They would purchase stock when they received 
"good" information - indicating favorable firm prospects - and 
sell when they discovered "bad" information before transmitting the 
information to other insiders who would drive the market price 
higher by their purchases or lower by their sales. When the informa-
tion is later publicly disseminated, the insiders would sell on the 
good news or, if the news is bad, buy to "cover" their prior short-
sales, 16 or do nothing if their prior sales were only of stock that they 
owned at the time. 
While the initial purchases or sales might occasion little delay -
short-sellers on "bad" information and purchasers on "good" inf or-
mation have an incentive to transmit information upward quickly17 
.- profit-maximizing insiders, before transmitting information up-
ward, might attempt to arrange loans to purchase or sell a greater 
amount of stock than their available resources would otherwise per-
mit. Insiders might also convey the information to select corporate 
outsiders to whom they owe favors or from whom they expect future 
benefits. Even if the delay at each hierarchical level were slight, the 
aggregate delay in upward transmission to the top decision-making 
levels might be substantial. Assuming that higher level officials 
make the important decisions, informational delay within the organ-
ization will also increase with the importance of the decision and its 
likely impact on stock, as will the delay in releasing the information 
to the public. 
These incentives for delay and internal competition for insider 
mist, as part of his critique of Professor Henry G. Manne's book in favor of insider trading. 
On this point, Williamson stated: 
It is not obvious that the information hoarding which insider trading would seem to re-
quire would also have ideal properties from the standpoint of the firm. The conflict is 
between the necessity to provide "impacted" information (so as to prevent the disclosure 
of significant developments to free riders) and the demands for effective information ex-
change within a complex, hierarchical organization. Can an information system be 
designed for the unitary form organization that avoids the free-ride problem without im-
pairing coordination and inducing subgoal pursuit of a debilitating sort? This seems 
doubtful. 
0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 8, at 9S. 
16. "Short-selling" (on bad information) involves the sale of stock not owned by the seller. 
The stock is borrowed by the seller from the brokerage firm through which the seller transacts 
the short-sale. Later, when the market price falls, the short-seller "covers" the short-sale by 
purchasing stock in the market at the lower price and delivering that stock to the broker. The 
short-seller thus profits by the difference between the higher short-sale price and lower cover-
ing price. Section 16(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits short-selling by any 
director or officer (or beneficial owner of more than 10% of the stock) of the corporation. 
Thus, profit maximization at the highest corporate levels in the case of bad information would 
be limited by the number of shares owned by those insiders. 
17. See note 19 U!fra and accompanying text. 
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trading profits would increase the normal distortion in the upward 
transmission of information. And the usual organizational counter-
measures to informational distortion would likely fail. Superiors 
would not know how nor in which direction to counter-bias or dis-
count information because they could not accurately perceive the 
subordinate's self-interest. Subordinates with incentives to delay or 
compete may understate information or mislead superiors, while 
others seeking quick profits may exaggerate the information to bring 
about a rise in the stock price ( or a fall if the information is "bad"). 
An increase in competition among hierarchical levels, moreover, 
would reduce ''trust" between senders and receivers. And the rele-
vant· superior might choose not to delegate decision-making down-
ward even when delegation is the most efficient solution to 
information distortion. The superior would have to weigh the per-
sonal benefit of less work resulting from that delegation against the 
trading and informational opportunities delegation forecloses. All 
things being equal, otherwise efficient downward delegation in the 
complex organization would decrease. 
Organizational efficiency is usually also promoted by the cohe-
siveness of the unit to which decision-making is delegated. Add the 
potential for trading profits to the unit's previously efficient "pro-
gram"18 for dealing with the complex environment, and the unifs 
efficiency may diminish. And, as Part II will demonstrate, if the 
members of the unit choose to capture such profits individually 
rather than cooperatively, work groups will become less cohesive 
and the quality of their decisions will fall. 
The power to decide also implies the power to manipulate busi-
ness decisions with an eye to potential trading profits. Although the 
deciders could not manipulate often without being exposed for their 
misdeeds and possibly fired, a few manipulations per level multi-
plied by the number of decision-making levels might substantially 
injure the firm. The opportunity to manipulate, moreover, might 
weigh against the.superior's otherwise efficient downward delegation 
and thus further reduce the quality of corporate decision-making. 
There are substantial constraints on this scenario of lessened effi-
ciency and exacerbated-informational distortion. Insiders cannot un-
reasonably delay or grossly distort information in the authoritarian 
and hierarchical organization that is the modem large corporation. 
Their costs would be too high: loss of employment or reduced com-
pensation. The delayers and distorters also could not adversely af-
18. See note 14.ru_pra. 
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feet the organization ''too much," or else they might eliminate their 
opportunity to profit in the future. 
The potential of hierarchical levels to hoard information to maxi-
mize profits is also limited by the need of lower level purchasers and 
short-sellers to transmit the information upward for more highly 
profiled and publicly visible action by the higher levels. These visi-
ble actions will allow the lower level employees to realize gains in 
the public markets by their offsetting sales or purchases after public 
disclosure more quickly and without the uncertain investment risks 
of delay.19 Whether the balance of considerations would lead to 
quicker and more accurate upward transmission of information is 
the crux of the issue. The answer may depend on particular circum-
stances - the trading position taken and potential profits - and on 
the nature of the particular information. While one can credibly ar-
gue that with a free trading rule good news would move up faster 
(but with more "puffing") than it does today, I believe that on bal-
ance permitting insider trading would increase delay and distortion 
and thus impair decision-making that depends on timely and accu-
rate information from below. 
When the higher levels do obtain the information, they will also 
trade. But this may take its toll on the organizational morale below 
because ultimately the higher echelons can use inside corporate in-
formation more effectively and profitably.20 Lower level insiders 
will recognize that each succeeding level upward possesses greater 
financial resources and over-all knowledge of corporate activities 
than the last. They will thus know that the next level upward stands 
to profit more and can react more effectively to the bits of informa-
tion that the lower level receives. · 
What are some of the counter-arguments to the reduced organi-
zational efficiency scenario? First, there is no direct empirical evi-
dence to support it, either in the pre-prohibition experiences of 
American corporations or in the experiences of corporations in coun-
tries with no prohibition. This must be conceded. But a partial an-
swer is that data were never collected through the sieve that this 
Article suggests. The present illegality of insider trading makes it un-
likely that any meaningful empirical evidence can be obtained today 
19. If the nonpublic material information was bad (i.e., unfavorable to the firm's prospects) 
and the insider sold only the stock. that he then owned, there would be no countervailing need 
to transmit the information upward for publicly visible action by the higher levels. In the case 
of a short-sale by the insider, see note 16 supra, this countervailing need would exist. 
20. See Schotland, supra note 8, at 1452. 
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in the United States or in countries, such as Canada or Great Britain, 
with roughly similar cultures that also prohibit insider trading. 
Second, those corporations that insider trading may potentially 
damage can voluntarily prohibit the practice.21 But who would 
move particular corporations toward an insider trading ban? Would 
the board of directors and chief executive voluntarily eliminate their 
own potentially immense pro.fits under a laissez faire rule when they 
demanded contractual provisions prohibiting insider trading from 
others? This seems doubtful. If they demanded such provisions from 
employees but did not themselves agree to the trading restrictions, 
resentment and cynicism would brew below, and the restrictions 
would be counter-productive. 
It requires strong faith in the efficiency of the free market to ar-
gue that the stock market or other markets might then punish the 
nonsigning directors and top officers or the corporation itself and 
eventually lead to the ouster, through a shareholder vote or takeover, 
of those "errant" agents who continue to favor free trading for them-
. selves. Lower earnings or other economic benchmarks of poor per-
formance would presumably signal to the market the internal 
inefficiency caused by insider trading. But the market would not 
usually be in a position to attribute the lower earnings to increased 
informational distortion or delay because of many possible alterna-
tive explanations.22 Nor would the key managers, with their bia~ 
toward insider trading pro.fits, subjectively attribute the inefficiency 
to less than optimal business decisions caused by increased informa-
tional distortion or delay. 
Third, with insider trading by all employees, the higher echelons 
arguably would learn about significant corporate events, through 
the movement of the company's stock price, sooner and with less 
distortion than they do today, given the present and pervasive up-
21. Professor Manne would undoubtedly concur with this suggestion. He has stated: 
At no point in my entire book do I express the belief that corporations should be required 
to tolerate insider trading .•.. [l]fthrough legal means a corporation properlf indicates 
that its rule is no insider trading, that should be the business of that corporation and its 
shareholders and the courts if a violation is alleged. 
Manne, supra note 8, at 581 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Corporations would be 
required to disclose publicly "whether or not insiders will be allowed to use information in the 
stock market or under what conditions this will be allowed." Id 
22. This discussion assumes that every corporation would be required to disclose publicly 
whether and on what conditions it prohibits or allows insider trading. Requiring every insider 
to report publicly his actual trading by a public filing would make additional information 
available to the market See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) 
(1976) (requiring such a filing in the case of all trades by officers and directors). And if, in the 
case of comparable corporations, some permitted insider trading, while others prohibited it, 
the market (or its more sophisticated participants) might then be in a position to make accurate 
attributions concerning informational distortion or delay. 
April 1982] Insider Trading 1059 
ward informational blockages. This position is a slight variation on 
the efficient market argument that permitting insiders to trade on 
material nonpublic information would tend to move the market in 
the. correct direction.23 The argument might hold in the intra-orga-
nizational context only in the unlikely event that all of the following 
occur: (1) the lower levels are financially able to trade in relatively 
large amounts so that the stock price may "signal" the upper levels; 
(2) the upper levels actually monitor the stock price and volume; and 
(3) the upper levels, on the basis of accurate information, are able to 
exclude each of the following other plausible explanations for the 
price movements: (a) outside sources are incorrectly interpreting in-
formation previously obtained from the company and its insiders; 
(b) outside sources are incorrectly adopting tumors circulating in the 
market; and (c) the lower levels are incorrectly interpreting the over-
all effect of tidbits of information. 
Fourth, one might argue that under a laissez faire trading rule the 
upper levels would become better informed and less subject to inf or-
mational blockages because of their .real incentives to dip down into 
the hierarchy for critical information. The higher levels would then 
trade accurately in large amounts and correctly signal the market as 
to corporate developments. The argument is another efficient mar-
ket variation, with the added bonus of increased organizational effi-
ciency. These informational benefits to the organization and the · 
market may some day be convincingly demonstrated so as to over-
come the decreased organizational efficiency argument, but I doubt 
that this will occur. 
Fifth, the decreased organizational efficiency argument assumes 
the frequent flow at most hierarchical levels of "material" informa-
tion; to the extent that this is not so, the posited injury to the organi-
zation is reduced. All levels receive far more mundane information 
than information that is spectacular. Only rarely are low-level em-
ployees at the right spot at the right time to learn of a prospective 
major earnings decline or dividend cut. And a GM machinist could 
not confidently base a short-sale on his or a co-workers bad fit of a 
screw into one car>s template. 
Insider trading opportunities, however, do not usually depend on 
23. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1978) (concluding that "even when 
confronted with the possibility of a trade-off between fairness and economic efficiency, most 
authorities appear to find that the balance tips in favor of discouraging insider trading" (foot-
note omitted)}; Manne, supra note 8, at 565-75; Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 260 (1968); Note, The .E.flicient Capital 
Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. 
REV. 1031, 1073 (1977). 
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information that is material on its own. As Professor James Lorie, 
the eminent economist, has stated: "With respect to the analysis of 
securities, information is anything that changes the investor's subjec-
tive probability distribution with respect to future market prices or 
retums."24 Securities analysts profit today under Lorie's observation 
by fitting tidbits of nonmaterial information legally provided to them 
by insiders into the "mosaic" of publicly available information. In-
siders at most hierarchical levels can probably fit their tidbits into 
the mosaic of other nonpublic information that they acquire, so that 
the totality would be in many cases "material." Furthermore, an in-
sider who believes that particular information is "material" when it 
is not, or is material only if other related information can be ac-
quired, will have the same incentives to delay and distort the inf or-
mation as insiders who actually possess material information. Thus, 
the decreased organizational efficiency argument does not wholly 
rely on the upward flow of "material" information. 
JI. DECISION-MAKING AT THE TOP LEVEL 
Most of the recent insider trading "scandals" involved nonpublic 
information initially received at the highest levels in the corporation. 
The information has often related to prospective tender offers, merg-
ers, or acquisitions.25 In these situations, if insider trading were 
freely permitted such trading would "signal" the stock market that a 
particular company will be the target of a tender offer or an acquisi-
tion proposal because the bidder or acquirer's directors and chief 
executive would purchase target stock in large amounts and drive the 
price up. If the bidder forewarned the target of its tender off er, the 
target board and chief executive, assuming that they were willing to 
"do business" with the prospective bidder, would also purchase tar-
get stock. Market efficiency in such a situation would be enhanced 
by insider trading. 26 
But an emphasis on the less spectacular aspects of corporate life 
and top-level decision-making may be more significant. Most chief 
executive or board decisions involve not tender offers or acquisitions, 
24. Lorie, Insider Trading: Rule J0b-5, .Disclosure, and Corporate Privacy: A Comment, 9 J, 
LEGAL Snm. 819, 820 (1980). 
25. See Keown & Pinkerton, Merc_er Announcements and Insider Trading Activil)': An Em-
pirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855 (1981); Louis, The Unwinnable War on Insider Trading, 
FORTUNE, July 13, 1981, at 72 ("Of the 39 insider cases brought by the SEC since 1978, 27 
were concerned with takeovers."); Editorial, Want a Hot Tip?, BARRONS, July 6, 1981, at 7. 
26. The bidder corporation, however, may be harmed because it may have to raise its 
planned offering price to reflect the increase in the target's stock price caused by the insider 
purchases prior to the public announcement. 
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but major allocations of corporate resources, long-term and strategic 
planning, markets, products, and :financing. 
Would a rule permitting insider trading affect this decision-mak-
ing at the top level? Part I of this Article argued that top level deci-
sions that are highly dependent on timely receipt of accurate 
information from below would likely suffer because of the increased 
delay and distortion in the upward transmission of the information. 
But even assuming that laissez faire insider trading would not result 
in informational blockage or that this blockage could be counter-
acted, we must still consider the impact of permitting top-level in-
sider trading on the quality of decision-making at the apex of the 
largest American corporations. 
Until recently, management dominated the boards of directors of 
these corporations. As lower-rank officers and business associates of 
the corporation, directors on the old board were generally beholden 
to one "director," the chief executive. In contrast, the new board 
now typically has a majority of directors who are "independent" of · 
management. It has emerged as a peer group - a collegial body of 
equals, with the chief executive as the prima inter pares - and as 
such is uniquely positioned to make business decisions of the highest 
quality.27 The evidence from the behavioral sciences indicates that, 
all other things being equal, the new board will make higher quality 
decisions than both other ad hoc decision-making groups· in the cor-
poration and individuals, including the chief executive. And, all 
other things being equal, to the extent that the new board becomes 
cohesive (which seems likely), the quality of its decisions will im-
prove. Although the evidence to date is somewhat conflicting, the 
new board is effectively beginning to assert greater power over the 
course and direction of affairs in these corporations. If the behav-
ioral science :findings hold, this trend is encouraging: to the extent 
that the new board engages in decision-:making, the corporation will 
be better off. 
If we introduce a free insider trading rule into this cohesive peer 
group and assume that information is distortion-free and timely, will 
we impair the quality of decision-making? The answer might well 
depend on whether the directors competed with each other for trad-
ing profits or agreed to cooperate and share the profits. Empirical 
:findings drawn from the behavioral sciences, most notably social 
27. This thesis and the assertions made in the balance of the paragraph in the text are 
detailed in a previous article. See Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board· Beha11iora/ Sci-
ence and Corporate Law, 80 MlcH. L. REv. 1 (1981). 
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psychology, confirm our intuitions: competition among directors 
would adversely affect their decision-making. 
Competition among directors for trading pro.fits would create dis-
trust in the group. As studies of business and other decision-making 
groups have confinned,28 trust among_ the members of a group is an 
essential precondition to quality decision-making. Distrustful group 
members conceal or distort relevant information and disguise ideas 
and conclusions to provide information that is low in accuracy, com-
prehensiveness, and timeliness. The distortion that they introduce 
compounds the complexity and uncertainty inherent in every major 
business decision, increasing the probability that underlying 
problems will go undetected or avoided and making solutions more 
difficult to identify. Such a group will seize an expedient solution to 
end its problem task. Conversely, high-trust groups provide rele-
vant, accurate, and timely information. Their members are also less 
likely to misinterpret the intentions and behavior of others. Trust 
among group members thus promotes identification and examina-
tion of underlying problems and generates solutions that are more 
likely to be appropriate, creative, and long-range. 
Closely related to distrust among group members is "opportunis-
tic" behavior by members of peer groups. Professor Oliver E. Wil-
liamson, the noted economist, argues that such behavior impairs the 
group's effectiveness. One of the three chief abuses that he notes is 
'Joining the peer group in order to acquire knowhow and to learn 
trade secrets, thereafter to set up a rival organization .... Disin-
centives must be devised to discourage members from joining for the 
strategic purpose of acquiring learning-by-doing advantages, and 
then resigning."29 Members of insider trading peer groups will ob-
tain greater pro.fits by remaining in the group than by resigning. 
Nevertheless, Williamson's observation that opportunism detracts 
from the group's effectiveness would still appear to hold. 
Would the directors compete with each other for trading profits 
or would they cooperate and agree to share their pro.fits and losses? 
If they competed inter se, suspicion would prevail, undermining ·co-
hesiveness among group members and the quality of business deci-
sions by the peer group at the corporate apex. If the directors ( or a 
majority of them) opted for a ''take the money and run" solution, 
they might attempt to maximize individual pro.fits by competing over 
the short term - until the shareholders or the market discovered the 
28. See note 13 supra. 
29. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note II, at 47-48. 
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fact - rather than by cooperating over a longer term. Each director 
would be strongly tempted to dip down into the hierarchy to dis-
cover the latest and best information on which to profit. In the pro-
cess, a director might make alliances and side deals with those below 
whom the director considered best for personal purposes. Competi-
tion might thus tum management information systems designed for 
corporate purposes into stock niarket ticker tapes. The market 
would arguably become more "efficient,'' but it is doubtful that the 
corporation would become so. . 
Since low trust and opportunistic behavior appear to be detri-
mental to group effectiveness, and given the huge profit potential of 
insider trading by directors, the directors might agree to cooperate as 
a group rather than compete as individuals for these profits. Such 
cooperation, which could be formalized by a contract among the di-
rectors to share profits ( and losses), might well maintain group trust 
and, through group-monitoring, reduce or eliminate individual op-
portunism. The director's incentive to do so would be strong because 
of the direct relationships among board effectiveness, continuance in 
office, and profit maintenance. The independent directors would 
then carefully "monitor'' the chief executive's "performance,'' with 
far greater incentives to do so than the present "directors-as-
monitors" model contemplates. 30 
A legal rule imposing fiduciary duties on directors inter se could 
then ensure the efficiency gains that this cooperative scenario might 
provide by requiring insider trading to be cooperative. Relations 
among directors would then resemble those among partners in a gen-
eral partnership.31 However, such a scenario would destroy the 
equality among directors underlying the findings of peer group supe-
riority in decision-making.32 Even if we assume that the board 
members would share their trading profits, the chief executive would 
likely receive a greater partnership share than the others because of 
his critical position in the information chain. Certain other directors 
might be in a position to bargain for higher shares as well. With 
30. The "directors-as-monitors" model was first proposed by Professor Melvin A. Eisen-
berg. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN CORPORATION 165-66 (1977). It 
has since been adopted by most legal and business commentators. 
31. For a discussion of fiduciary duties among partners, see Anderson, Co,!f!icts of Interest: 
Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. R.Ev. 738, 759-61, 771_-72, 793-94 
(1978); Dooley, supra note 8, at 64-65; Scott, supra note 2, at 815. 
32. Yet another argument for permitting insider trading might be that it would increase the 
quality of board decision-making because independent directors would work harder than they 
do today. The huge profit potentials of such a rule would create strong incentives for talented 
individuals to come to the board and perform well. This "entrepreneurial reward" prong of 
Professor Manne's thesis has been well answered by others. See note 8 supra. 
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senior, middle and junior partners, the new board would return to 
the old process of hierarchical decision-making and could no longer 
claim peer group decision-making superiority. And, given the large 
personal stakes that directors would have in corporate affairs, corpo-
rations would lose the anticipated benefits of the recent governance 
changes. Specifically, the "independent" directors would become 
management directors rather than "monitors" and "discipliners" of 
management performance. That the market alone did not appear to 
monitor adequately was the raison d'etre for installing a majority of 
independent directors in our very largest corporations; a rule permit-
ting insider trading would undermine that gain. 
III. TIPPEES OF CORPORATE INSIDERS 
How far can liability be extended to persons outside the organi-
zation who receive material nonpublic information from insiders? 
The Fair Play, Informed Markets, and Business Property rationales 
can be logically extended to such "tippees" of corporate directors, 
officers, and employees.33 The Internal Efficiency rationale may also 
justify tippee liability. 
The typical outside recipients of material nonpublic information 
are organizations, such as investment and commercial banking firms, 
that have regular and on-going relationships with the corporation. 
The corporation transmits and the banking firms receive this infor-
mation with legitimate business purposes in mind and understand 
implicitly that the information will remain confidential. Undoubt-
edly, an insider may casually tip a friend on the golf course, but the 
effect of such tips is more random and of less magnitude than the 
regular and legitimate flow of corporate information to those power-
ful economic organizations, the large investment and commercial 
bankers. 
These bankers, like law firms, accounting firms, and financial 
printing firms, are "agents" - in the economic sense - of the corpo-
33. The Fair Play rationale focuses on the inequality of information possessed by the par-
ticular persons on each side of a particular trade. Both the insider and the tippee of an insider 
take advantage of the nonpublic information knowing that it is unavailable to the person on 
the other side of the trade. See text at note 3 Sllpra. The Informed Market rationale empha-
sizes the rapid flow of corporate information to the overall market (not to particular traders). 
Whether the insider or the insider's tippee is presently withholding the information from the 
market to obtain trading profits is unimportant because the information is still not flowing into 
the market. See text at notes 4-5 S11pra. The Business Property rationale treats the information 
simply as the property of the corporation. See text at notes 6-7 Sllpra. The stolen property or 
its equivalent can be recovered from either or both the thief (the insider) or the recipient (the 
tippee). The corporation's property rights are vindicated in either case. 
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ration.34 If the agency organization profits by trading on the infor-
mation, its indulgence will be "signaled" to the corporate principal 
and to others, to its likely detriment. Agency organizations, how-
ever, rarely breach their obligations to keep the confidences secret 
after a conscious organizational decision to do so. More often, the 
cause of the agent's breach lies with individuals or subunits in the 
agent's own organization. These individuals or subunits are usually 
acting detrimentally to the agent's organization. 
United States v. Newman,35 a recent decision, provides the para-
digm fact pattern. The defendant's alleged coconspirators, who held 
key positions at two prominent investment banking firms, allegedly 
conveyed confidential information to the defendant concerning pro-
spective tender offers received by their firms as agents of the bidders. 
The defendant, together with two confederates, then purchased 
shares of the target companies. When the proposed takeovers be-
came known to the public and the target's stock predictably in-
creased in value, the conspirators sold out and divided the profits. 36 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the legal suf-
ficiency of the federal securities law counts on the ground that the 
coconspirators misappropriated valuable nonpublic information en-
trusted to them by their employers, the investment banking firms. 
The damage to the investment firms could have been substantial be-
cause the conspirators' actions signaled the firms' potential unrelia-
bility to the corporate market. As the Court of Appeals stated: "By 
sullying the reputations of [the coconspirators'] employers as safe re-
positories of client confidences, appellee and his cohorts defrauded 
those employers as surely as if they took their money.''37 The same 
potential damage to law, accounting, and financial printing firms 
34. In the strict legal sense, commercial banks are not "agents" of the borrower corpora-
tions. See Note, Regulating the Use of Co,!ftdenllaf Ieformation in Tender Offer Financing: A 
Common Law Solution, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 838, 856-59 (1981). However, the Note's analysis 
fails to account for the fact that corporations deposit funds in the banks from which they 
borrow, and a legal agency relationship is created in favor of a depositor with the bank's 
"qualified obligation not to reveal confidential information relating to that depositor's ac-
counL" Id at 859. 
35. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 98,332 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981). Accord SEC v. 
Lund, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 98,428 (C.D. Cal Jan. 22, 1982); O'Connor & 
Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 98,443 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 30, 1981, amended Jan. 19, 1982). 
36. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 98,332, at 92,050. 
37. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 98,332, at 92, 052. The Court sustained the mail 
fraud counts in the indictment on the same misappropriation theory coupled with the breach 
of the employees' fiduciary duties by material misrepresentations to the employer and material 
nondisclosures of their buying activities (which they were specifically required to report). 
[Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) , 98,332, at 92,053-54. 
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representing corporate clients would be inflicted by errant lawyers, 
accountants, or "make-up" employees. 
The tippee thus appears to have "damaged" both the agent's or-
ganization and the business corporation from which the information 
emanated. The client corporation might assert claims against the 
agent institution and the latter's disloyal employee?8 and the agent's 
stockholders or partners might sue the g1,1ilty individual or subunit of 
the organization in a derivative action. If we allow such claims, are 
we too far afield from the objective of preventing organizational 
damage to the business corporation from which the information em-
anated? The answer should be in the negative, if we candidly admit 
that the primary purpose of insider trading liability is deterrence 
rather than compensation.39 The risk that the disloyal individuals 
will pay twice for their conduct will serve that purpose. Extending 
liability to tippees might also remove further incentives for the in-
sider to delay or distort the upward transmission of information 
within the corporation. The objectives of the Internal Efficiency ra-
tionale are accurate and timely internal transmission of information 
38. The claim by the client corporation is supported by traditional state agency law. An 
agent is required to account to the principal for any profit gained through the use of confiden-
tial information, even if the principal was not harmed. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 338, Comment c (1958). The claim by the corporation (the "principal") can be 
asserted against both the agent organization (the legal "agent") and its disloyal employee (a 
legal "subagent"). See w. SELL, AGENCY 17 (1975). 
39. The focus of this Article is on insider trading on the national securities markets, not on 
face-to-face transactions between the insider and another. In the anonymous market, the in-
sider says or does nothing except to call his broker to buy or sell. The person on the other side 
of the trade is there fortuitously through his broker. This "public trader'' would have traded 
anyway, and most likely at or near the same price. That public trader, as well as all other 
public traders thereafter, traded at the prices they did, not because of the insider's trade but 
because of the nondisclosure of material information that, if disclosed, would have affected the 
prices of all trades. Had the insider not traded at all, all the trading that occurred likely would 
have occurred anyway, and at the same (or very similar) prices. See note 3 supra; Dooley, 
supra note 8, at 33. But see Mendelson, supra note 8, at 485-86; Wang, supra note 8, at 1234-
40. And neither the nontrading insider nor the company would have incurred liability to any 
traders because rule IOb-5 does not mandate disclosure of material nonpublic information. 
The obligation of the insider to "disclose or abstain" from trading on material nonpublic infor-
mation reduces to a ban on insider trading. Thus, the idea of "compensating" the public 
trader on the other side of the trade with the insider, or the public traders who transacted 
"contemporaneously" with the insider, or who transacted from that time until disclosure to the 
public of the material information does not comport with the realities of the anonymous secur-
ities markets. The Internal Efficiency rationale could provide a basis for compensatory dam-
ages, but the amount of damages sustained by the corporation in a particular case would be 
difficult to establish. 
Thus, if an insider who trades on material nonpublic information is held to be liable, the 
primary basis must be deterrence, not compensation. The New York Court of Appeals in 
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 503, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 85 (1969), 
enunciated this policy with respect to insider trading: "Only by sanctioning such a cause of 
action will there be any effective method to prevent the type of abuse of corporate office com-
plained of in this case." 
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and high quality decisions; whether the insider or the insider's tippee 
causes the adverse effects is irrelevant. 
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERNAL EFFICIENCY 
RATIONALE 
The argument that a free insider trading rule would adversely 
affect the corporation's efficiency and decision-making has legal im-
plications that this Part of the Article considers. First, the proposi-
tion goes beyond the Business Property rationale by providing a 
basis for asserting injury to the corporation in every case of insider 
trading. As Professor Scott observes, the Business Property rationale 
"implies that the injured party is the company."40 He concludes that 
this rationale cannot be extended to all cases because not every per-
sonal use of confidential corporate information has the potential to 
injure the corporation. His "impression is that application [of the 
insider trading ban] to protect investments in socially valuable dis-
coveries is justifiable, but beyond that the case becomes increasingly 
dubious."41 Scott includes as socially valuable discoveries "new 
mineral deposits and companies that could be made more productive 
and profitable."42 However, the Internal Efficiency rationale that 
this Article suggests applies to all cases of insider trading based on 
material nonpublic information because of the internal distortions 
that such trading would likely cause. Since any exceptions to a rule 
prohibiting insider trading may undermine corporate efficiency and 
the quality of decision-making, liability under the rationale would 
be more expansive. 
Second, because the Internal Efficiency rationale: (a) focuses ex-
clusively on the internal affairs of the corporation; and (b) asserts 
that the corporation is injured, its federal concerns are almost nonex-
istent and its state concerns are strong. The national securities mar-
kets and the trading public have been traditional federal concerns at 
least since 1934, when Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act. 
The Act contains the two principal provisions relevant to insider 
trading, sections lO(b) and 16(b). Rule lOb-5, promulgated under 
section lO(b ), is the source of the present "disclose or abstain" rule, 
which in effect prohibits insiders from trading on the basis of mate-
rial nonpublic information.43 Both the Fair Play and Informed Mar-
40. Scott, supra note 2, at 805. 
41. Id at 818. 
42. Id at 815. 
43. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-30 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur 
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 
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ket rationales focus upon the national securities markets and the 
trading public. Either rationale, if accepted, provides a basis for fed-
eral enforcement under rule IOb-5. The Business Property and In-
ternal Efficiency rationales focus on the corporation's interests, a 
concern that is rather far removed from the national securities mar-
kets. And, as the Supreme Court has reminded us, the internal af-
fairs of the corporation are matters "traditionally relegated to state 
law, in an area basically the concern of the States . . . ."44 The co-
existence of state and federal remedies, therefore, may depend on 
which rationales the courts accept. 
Third, because the Internal Efficiency rationale posits that the 
corporate entity is injured, the applicable civil legal enforcement de-
vice is a shareholder's derivative suit against the inside traders, with 
the recovery going to the corporation.45 The derivative suit is also 
appropriate because deterrence - the primary goal of derivative 
suits46 - and compensation - a secondary goal - precisely parallel 
the relative purposes of a rule prohibiting insider trading. But a fed-
eral derivative suit based on the Internal Efficiency rationale would 
not be available because of the limitation of suits under rule l0b-5 to 
purchasers or sellers of securities. 47 
1910), '!ffd in part, revd in part and remanded on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). 
44. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
45. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.B.2d 910 
(1969); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949). 
46. S~e Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the JJerivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Propo• 
salfor Legislative Reform, 81 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 261, 302-09 (1981). 
These three objections - the likelihood of share transfers between the time of the 
wrong and that of the recovery, the lack of congruence between corporate gains and losses 
and those of shareholders, and the trivial size of the t¥Pical recovery on a pro-rated basis 
- do not imply that compensation is an illusory or msignificant goal. But they do cast 
considerable doubt on its ability to serve as the central rationale of the derivative action. 
In contrast, a deterrent rationale for the derivative action is not significantly affected 
by these problems. From a deterrent perspective, it matters less who gets the recovery 
than who pays it; sanctions have a role independent of their ability to make victims whole. 
In addition, the derivative action is in some ways naturally adapted to a deterrent ration-
ale, principally because it harnesses private enforcement resources and focuses its penal-
ties on the individual rather than the corporation. 
Id at 305 (footnote omitted). 
41. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Ratner, Federal and 
State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trading, 31 Bus. LAW. 947, 957, 960 (1976). In Blue 
Chip, the Court held that only a purchaser or seller (of securities) has standing to bring a 
private action for damages under rule lOb-5 (the rule). Since the corporation is usually not a 
purchaser or seller with respect to the insider's trades on the securities market, it has no stand-
ing to sue the insider. See, e.g., Davidge v. White, 377 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). It 
necessarily follows that a stockholder's derivative suit on behalf of the corporation for insider 
trading under the rule is foreclosed by Blue Chip. 
Blue Chip reaffirmed the long-standing Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirement formulated 
by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The Birnbaum rule was subject to some exceptions, including pri-
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Fourth, because detection may be extremely difficult, the most 
realistic method to deter insider trading might be to provide for cor-
porate recovery of double or treble the amount of the insider's profit 
or loss avoidance.48 This would require a new statute in most states, 
vate suits for injunctive relief. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1036-
38 (4th ed. 1977); Note, Standing Under Rule J0b-5 Afler Blue Chip Stamps, 75 MICH. L. REv. 
413 (1976). The lower courts after Blue Chip have continued to recognize the Birnbaum excep-
tions. See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir. 1977) (dictum), cert. 
denied, 436 U.S. 905,913 (1978); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 
1976) (dictum); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1357-59 (N.D. 
Tex. 1979). 
The point of this is that the Supreme Court, consistent with the policies enunciated in Blue 
Chip, could, ifit were so disposed (an unlikely proposition), permit a shareholder's derivative 
action to enforce the rule's ban on insider trading. In Blue Chip, the Court discussed certain 
policy considerations in support of restricting private damage claims under the rule to actual 
purchasers or sellers. Principal among them was ''the danger of vexatious litigation which 
could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs .... " 421 U.S. at 740. Specifically, the 
Court cited ''the potential for nuisance or 'strike' suits in this type of litigation," and noted that 
"the abolition of the Birnbaum rule would throw open to the trier of fact many rather hazy 
issues of historical fact the proof of which depended almost entirely on oral testimony." 421 
U.S. at 740, 743. A derivative claim for insider trading under the rule would not present these 
risks: The violation of the rule would be clear, and the trading transaction by the insider 
defendant and the amount of the profit would be established by documentary evidence. Thus, 
the danger of strike suits brought without merit and the risks of large liability turning on 
plaintiffs' testimony would not exist. ''The fact of purchase of stock and the fact of sale of 
stock are generally matters which are verifiable by documentation, and do not depend upon 
oral recollection. •.. " 421 U.S. at 742. Indeed, defendants have been required to disgorge 
their insider trading profits in suits brought by the SEC under the rule. See,·e.g., SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), qffd. in part, revd. in part and remanded 
on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v. 
Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
A derivative suit under the rule, with the insider's profit going to the corporation, is a 
"neat" solution to the problems of private damage claims for insider trading. The courts have 
been struggling for years with the questions of who has been harmed by the insider's trade and 
the extent of the harm. In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 
228,241 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit suggested that the persons harmed might include all 
persons who traded on the side of the market opposite the insider from the time of the insider's 
trade (or tip to another) until the time the material nonpublic information was publicly dis-
closed and disseminated by the company, even though the insider might thereby sustain "Dra-
conian liability." 495 F.2d at 242. But cf. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 326 (6th Cir. 
1976) (Celebrezze, J., concurring) (suggesting that only the traders who bought from or sold to 
the insider could sue the insider, or, at most, those that traded "contemporaneously'' opposite 
the insider's side of the market), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). In Elkind v: Liggett & 
Meyers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 173 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit retreated from Shapiro and 
limited the insider's damage liability to his profit (or loss avoidance), which all contemporane-
ous traders might share. These varying "solutions" try to come to grips with the difficulty or 
impossibility of locating, on the national securities markets, the particular person on the oppo-
site side of the trade with the insider. Further, there are substantial doubts whether that per-
son, even if located, was damaged by the insider's trade because he would have traded on the 
anonymous market in any event, at or near the same price. See notes 3 and 39 supra; Dooley, 
supra note 8, at 33. But see Mendelson, supra note 8, at 485-86; Wang, supra note 8, at 1234-
40. 
48. See w. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 728-29 (5th ed. unabr. 1980) (diffi-
culty of detecting insider trading). Professor Dooley argues that enforcement of the insider 
trading prohibition has been ineffective and costly, and the sanctions arbitrary. See Dooley, 
supra note 8, at 19-20, 24-25, 68, 73. He ultimately concludes that retention of "[t]he existing 
system •.• is indefensible." Id. at 73. But when he focuses solely on enforcement of the 
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unless the state courts allowed punitive damages. A corporate recov-
ery of the pro.fit under state law coupled with an individual suit or 
class action under rule lOb-5 for the same amount based on viable 
Fair Play or Informed Market rationales might effectively hold out 
the threat of a double recovery.49 Indeed, this may be the present 
law applicable to New York corporations. In .Diamond v. 
Oreamuno,50 the New York Court of Appeals upheld a derivative 
suit under state law for insider trading, with the corporate recovery 
measured by the pro.fit ( or loss avoidance) that the insiders realized. 
In a federal action under rule lOb-5 today, the insiders can be re-
quired for deterrence purposes to disgorge their pro.fits into a court 
fund against which public traders might claim.51 Despite the New 
York court's desire to avoid a double recovery,52 the existence of 
parallel, but nonexclusive, federal and state claims for insider trad-
ing may well strike the proper deterrent balance and also satisfy, in a 
broad sense, the independent "compensatory'' claims of the corpo-
prohibition, he concludes that a "a fine system based on a multiple of trading profits probably' 
would be most effective." Id. (footnote omitted). 
49. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 503-04, 248 N.E.2d 910, 91S, 301 
N.Y.S.2d 78, 85-86 (1969) (state remedies can supplement federal remedies); 83 HARV. L. 
R.Ev. 1421, 1430 (1970); 1970 Wis. L. R.Ev. 576, 584-8S. 
50. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969) . ./Jiamond has not been 
adopted in any other state. In Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975), the Florida 
Supreme Court refused to adopt the ./Jiamond rationale. "[A]ctual damage to the corporation 
must be alleged in the complaint to substantiate a stockholders' derivative action." In Free• 
man v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1978), the court stated that the Indiana courts would 
most likely refuse to adopt ./Jiamond. It characterized ./Jiamond as a decision that "can best be 
understood as an example of judicial securities regulation." 584 F.2d at 196 (footnote omitted). 
Further, the ./Jecio court considered any asserted harm to corporate goodwill as speculative. 
Such harm was a basis for the ./Jiamond decision. In ./Jiamond, the court stated: 
[D]espite the lack of any specific allegation of damage, it may well be inferred that the 
defendants' actions might have caused some harm to the enterprise .... When.officers 
and directors abuse their position in order to gain personal profits, the effect may be to 
cast a cloud on the corporation's name, injure stockholder relations and undermine public 
regard for the corporation's securities. 
24 N.Y.2d at 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82. This Article argues that whatever 
external effects insider trading has on the corporation or the securities markets, it will ad-
versely affect the internal efficiency of the corporation. 
The leading incorporation state of Delaware, in a decision predating ./Jiamond, has ruled 
that a corporation could recover the insider trading profit of an employee who purchased stock 
with inside knowledge that the corporation would engage in a stock buy-in program on the 
open market The employee sold his stock at a profit after the corporation's purchases 
foreseeably drove up the stock price. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 246-47, 70 
A.2d 5, 8 (1949). It is an open question whether the Delaware courts would adopt ./Jiamond in 
the typical insider trading case, where the corporation does not buy or sell its stock close to the 
time of the insider's trades. 
51. See, e.g., SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257,260 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 92-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), ajfd inparl, revd in part and 
remanded on other gro1111ds, 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 100S (1971). 
52. The Court suggested instead that the defendants might protect themselves from multi-
ple actions by looking to the state's interpleader law. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 
504, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). 
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rate entity and of the traders in the national securities markets. The 
courts could also add criminal prosecution under certain state stat-
utes to the deterrence formula.53 
CONCLUSION 
Intellectual ferment about insider trading is on the rise once 
again. The reasons are clear: The considerations are complex and 
the relevant empirical evidence sparse. An additional perspective 
should be added to the complex mix: What are the effects, if any, of 
various insider trading rules on decision-making and efficiency in 
the large corporation? The Internal Efficiency rationale suggests that 
allowing insider trading would have adverse effects of a pervasive 
and systemic nature upon internal decision-making and efficiency. 
If this rationale were accepted as the sole basis for prohibiting 
insider trading, which this Article has not urged, then the legal con-
sequence might be to commit enforcement to state derivative suits. 
However, if the Fair Play (or "integrity of the markets") or Informed 
Market rationale is accepted as sufficient support for the present fed-
eral rule, the Internal Efficiency rationale can be viewed as icing on 
the federal cake or as a new basis for a separate and additional de-
rivative claim under state law, with deterrence as the goal. In any 
event, the end purpose of the instant effort is to fuel analysis and 
empiricism on the rationale that this Article has offered. 
53. Many states have enacted laws containing anti-fraud provisions modeled on Rule 
I0b-5 ..•. A number have adopted Section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act, which is 
substantially identical with l0b-5, and also Section 410, which provides for express liabil-
ity. (Section 4 lO(h) is designed to assure that no civil cause of action may be implied from 
§ 101). Some states prescribe civil liability for violation of § 101 equal to that implied 
under Rule l0b-5, or may afford the possibility of implying a civil remedy. See Shermer 
v. Baker, 2 Wash. App. 845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970). 
W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 48, at 718. Section 101 would provide the basis for a 
state criminal prosecution, provided the state courts were willing to read the section as pro-
scribing insider trading based on material nonpublic information, as the federal courts have 
done under rule lOb-5. Similarly, courts in certain states could provide an implied civil rem-
edy for insider trading under ~e particular version of the Uniform Securities Act adopted in 
those states. Id at 1333-34. 
Obviously, federal criminal prosecution under rule lOb-5 would promote deterrence. 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), exemplifies a relatively strong disposition of 
the Department of Justice towards prosecution, particularly because the defendant was a low-
level employee in a financial printing firm. Although the Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion, the government thereafter indicted a coconspirator whose investment banking firms were 
entrusted by bidders with information concerning the future targets of tender offers, and the 
Second Circuit sustained the sufficiencies of the indictment United States v. Newman, [Cur-
rent) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 98, 332 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981). 
